Panzer III: Lord of the Blitzkrieg

The PzKpfw III: Lord of the Blitzkrieg

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Technically the PzKpfw III was, despite minor faults, a well-balanced basic design which left provision for up-gunning and up-armouring, but by 1942 it was incapable of further modification that would enable it to keep pace with the spiral of gun/armour race. During the high years of Blitzkrieg it was the only weapon in the German tank arsenal that really counted and thus, like Napoleon’s vieux moustaches, it did not merely witness history in the making-it made it, from Channel to the Volga and from the Arctic to the North African desert. This achievement has, perhaps, been overshadowed in recent years by the study of later and more dramatic German designs, but the fact remains that it was the PzKpfw III that brought Hitler closet to achieving his wildest dreams. - Brian Perrett

Ostketten

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Model StuG.III Two

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Model StuG.III One

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Model Pz.III Five

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Model Pz.III Four

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Model Pz.III Three

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Model Pz.III Two

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Model Pz.III One

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Pz.III L/M Profile 3

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Pz.III L/M Profile 2

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Pz.III L/M Profile 1

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Pz.III L/M Detail VIII

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Pz.III L/M Detail VII

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Pz.III L/M Detail VI

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Pz.III L/M Detail V

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Pz.III L/M Detail IV

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Pz.III L/M Detail III

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Pz.III L/M Detail II

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Pz.III L/M Detail I

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Mountings based on PzKpfw III chassis

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The early development history of this chassis was plagued by difficulties with the suspension. These were solved in 1939 and resulted in the appearance of the Ausf. E, which employed a robust torsion bar system in conjunction with six small roadwheels per side. This model was powered by a 300hp 12-cylinder Maybach HL 120 TR engine, used in conjunction with a Maybach Variorex pre-selector gearbox with one reverse and 10 forward gears. In 1940 the latter was replaced in the Ausf. H by the simpler Aphon synchromesh gearbox with one reverse and six forward gears. Maximum speed was approximately 25mph. The Ausf. H also incorporated a strengthened torsion bar suspension and track width was increased from 36cm to 40cm. To compensate for this new sprockets and idlers were introduced, although existing stocks were also used in conjunction with spacer rings. The line of drive ran through the gearbox and then across the front of the driving compartment to the drive sprockets. The final drive and steering brake assembly was complex and incorporated what was considered to be an excessive number of ball races; the track brake drums were provided with an air cooling system. The user handbook recommended a maximum engine speed of 2,600rpm for normal usage, but in hot climates, which included southern Russia as well as North Africa, it was suggested that employment of a lower gear than was necessary would produce cooler running. The principal components in the cooling system were two radiators through which air was dragged by two fans. The tractive effort of the upper reaches of both the Variorex and Aphon gearboxes was disappointing and it was recommended that 'when changing to a lower gear on turnings, hills or bad roads, two gears lower than the one already engaged should be selected.' The air filter was also considered to be inadequate in dusty climates, permitting sand to enter the lubrication system. An electric self-starter system was provided, but this was for use in emergencies only and never with a cold engine. Normal starting was by means of an inertia system, the two-man starting handle entering the engine compartment through the stern plate. Cold starting was assisted by a starter carburettor which could not be used in conjunction with the accelerator. Minimum unassisted working temperature for the engine was 50 degrees centigrade at 2,000rpm with an oil pressure of not less than 60lb per square inch.

StuG III (Flamm)

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In 1943, 10 StuG IIIs were converted to StuG III (Flamm) configuration by replacing the main gun with a Schwade flamethrower. These chassis were all refurbished at the depot level and were a variety of pre-Ausf. F models. There are no reports to indicate any of these were used in combat and all were returned to Ausf. G standard at depot level by 1944.

Detail: Sturmgeschütz III Ausf. G Topfblende gun mantlet with co-ax MG

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Pz.III in Detail II

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Pz.III in Detail I

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STURMGESCHÜTZ III Late IV

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STURMGESCHÜTZ III Late III

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STURMGESCHÜTZ III Late II

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STURMGESCHÜTZ III Late I

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STURMGESCHÜTZ III

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Following from its experiences in World War I, the German army saw the need for an armoured mobile gun that could follow infantry attacks and provide fire support and the firepower to knock out strongpoints and bunkers. During the late 1930s such a gun was developed using the chassis, suspension and running gear of the PzKpfw III tank. This armoured gun was known as the Sturmgeschütz III though its formal designation was Gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette für Sturmgeschütz 7.5-cm Kanone SdKfz 142, (assault gun model 3) and it had the usual upper hull and turret of the tank replaced by a thick carapace of armour with a short 75-mm (2.95-in) gun mounted in the front. This weapon was first issued for service in 1940 (StuG III Ausf A) and was soon followed by a whole series of vehicles that gradually incorporated overall and detail improvements, to the extent that when the war ended in 1945 many were still in service on all fronts. The 1941 models were the StuG III Ausf B, C and D, while the slightly improved StuG III Ausf E appeared in 1942.

The main change to the Sturmgeschütz III (or StuG III) series was a gradual programme of upgunning, The original short 75-mm gun was an y 24 weapon (i.e. the length of the barrel was 24 times the calibre) and had limitations against many targets except at short ranges. Thus it was replaced by longer guns with improved performance, first an L/43 (StuG III Ausf F) and then an L/48 gun (StuG III Ausf G). The latter gun also provided the StuG series with an anti-tank capability, and this was in a way to the detriment of the original assault-support concept, for it was far easier to produce a StuG than it was a tank, so many StuG IIIs with L/48 guns were diverted to the Panzer divisions in place of battle tanks. Used as a tank-killer the StuG III had its moments, but it lacked traverse and adequate protection for the task. It had to be retained as such, however, for German industry simply could not supply enough tanks for the Panzer divisions.

As an assault gun the StuG III series was far more successful. Eventually the type was upgunned to the stage late in the war when many StuG Ills were armed with the powerful 10.5-cm (4.13-in) Sturmhaubitze, a special assault howitzer produced for the StuG III für 10.5-cm StuH 42 The first of these was completed in 1943, but manufacture of this variant was initially slow. Instead the version with the 75-mm L/48 gun was rushed off the production lines for the Panzer divisions.

The StuG III had a crew of four and extra machine-guns were often carried behind a shield on the roof. The protective mantlet for the main gun underwent many changes before it ended up as a Saukopf (literally 'pig's head') mantlet which proved very good protection. More protection against short-range hollow-charge warheads was provided with the addition of Schützen (literally 'skirts') along both sides. These were simply sheets of stand-off armour to detonate the warheads before they hit the vehicle armour, and were used on many German tanks after 1943. As a close-range assault support weapon the StuG III series was an excellent vehicle/weapon combination. It was also relatively cheap and easy to produce, and in war-time Germany that mattered a lot. Therefore the series was built in some numbers and numerically it was one of the most important German armoured vehicles.

Type Recognition Pz.IIIM

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIL

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIJ

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIH

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIG

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIF

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIE

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Type Recognition Pz.IIIB,C,D

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Type Recognition: Pz.IIIA

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Surviving Panzer III Tanks

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DOWNLOAD PDF HERE

AFV INTERIORS - Panzerkampwagen III, Ausf.J

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DOWNLOAD PDF HERE

PANZERKAMPFWAGEN III AUSF N ALS SCHIENEN-KETTEN FAHRZEUG SK1

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Type: Battle tank with railway suspension

History: Two or three prototypes of these SK1 were converted from Pz Kpfw III Ausf L (7.5cm L/24) during late 1942 and early 1943. The suspension was re-configured so as to allow the railway bogie wheels to be retracted into the belly for normal cross-country performance. The drive train was modified so that the rail bogies were driven by the tank engine. The speed on rails could reach 100km/hr. Saurer in Vienna carried out the development work on this project. The prototype was demonstrated on 20 October 1943.

Pz.IV turret with 5cm KwK 39 gun

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Pz.IV turret with 5cm KwK 39 gun probable precursor and feasibility test to the THE PANZERBEFEHLSWAGEN AUSF K???

Pz III in Africa

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Fiddler's Green - Paper Model - Pz.III

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WWII Panzerkampfwagen III (PzKpfw III) GermanTank

Panzer PzIII German WWII Medium Tank..
The first medium tank developed by Nazi Germany was the Pz. III, which did not enter active service in large numbers until 1939. The Pz. III was initially armed with a 37-mm antitank gun and two machine guns. It weighed about 20 tons, had a top road speed of 25 miles per hour, and carried a crew of five. About 100 Pz. III's fought in the Polish campaign and about 350 in the invasion of France. The need for greater firepower and more protection was apparent by 1941, so newer versions were given a 50-mm gun and fitted with armour 30–50 mm thick. The Pz. III could accommodate these improvements because it had been designed with a larger turret and a 12-cylinder, 300-horsepower engine

Panzer III in Russia

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PZ III J-3/L-447/M-213/N=700 CONVERSIONS

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Pz III Ns were converted from late Ausf Ls and Ausf Ms [213 converted]. Hence, III Ns have both the conventional exhausts seen on III Ls and water-wading type seen on III Ms. There were some Ausf. Ns built on Ausf. Js - (3) three.

To my knowledge, all III Ns shipped to Africa were based on the III L chassis [447 converted] and hence, the conventional exhaust. To my knowledge, these models were not fitted with the space armour as seen in the later Ns.

One of the more significant unit to have fought in Africa would be sPz Abt 501 with the III Ns serving as close support vehicles for the Tigers.

Pz III Ns converted from Ms were seen with and without space armour. The later ones also had the mantlet space armour fitted on. Also, late models used the one-piece hatch for the commander's cupola. These tanks served predominantly on the eastern front.

THE PANZERBEFEHLSWAGEN AUSF K

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'The turret was modified: the difference being a shortened gun mantlet, deletion of the coaxial machine-gun and the addition of a visor to the turret front, quite similar in design to the driver's visor.' - Note the inaccuracy of this information contained tin the above book Tom Jentz attempted to correct it in a revised 2nd edition proposal but the publisher would not proceed.

I draw your attention to 'Tanks Illustrated No. 27, HITLER'S PANZERS" page 33, plate 59. (Plate 226 in Encyclopedia of German Tanks).

This shows a full-blown Panzer III Ausf K, with Panzer IV/F turret mounting a 50mm gun on a panzer III/M chassis.

The turret has been rotated to the 3 o'clock position.

You see if you wanted to do anything, like fill the petrol tank, you had to traverse the turret off to open engine hatches. The feature of early command Panzer III's, with fixed turrets, was a massive frame antenna and no turret bustle to interfere with engine access.

What I would like to confirm is did that 50mm gun actually work? Speilburger lists no rounds carried.

I don't know how the Panzer IV Ausf F turret was mounted on the panzer III hull, but clearly it was and clearly it traversed, photographs show the turret overhanging the hull, which to me means the IV turret ring was necked down to fit the existing III hole.

More likely they fitted the (newly designed) turrets with a bottom plate carrying the Panzer III ring.

Spielburger tells us that in March 1942 serious consideration was given to mounting the Panzer IV turret on the Panzer III hull, evidence shows us this was more than a consideration. The Panzer III/K was probably the can it be done batch?

When consideration is given to up-gunning existing AFV designs more than the turret ring limitations must be examined. The Panzer III was capable of mounting the 7.5cm L/43 KwK at least, but its 'battle worthiness' is doubtful and this is the cause of its demise.

A Panzer III/N carried 64 rounds nearly half the (120) rounds carried by the original 3.7cmarmed version (Stug/G, 54 roundsof L/48).

In a revolving turret this would be limited to around 30+ rounds, useless as an MBT, time to look for something else.

Note the panzer III/K features going up the line, back to early hull mg position, extra antenna trough, panzer IV turret (note the rain trough above the crew hatch), the now identified Rauchpatrone canister holder and finally on the end vehicle you can see the vision port in the turret face. Interestingly they have no shurzen (early production?).

Film Replica of Pz.III

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A Panzer III replica shows up in the trailer of the newly released Edward Zwick film "Defiance." This vehicle is notable for being one of two Swiss Panzer 61 based "Panzer III" film prop conversions carried out for the 2001 film "Enemy at the Gates." At least one of these Pz.61 "Pz.IIIs" also made an appearance in "All the Queen's Men" (2001) and "The Pianist" (2002). The Swiss Pz. 61 or 68 makes for a decent, yet oversized Pz.III surrogate.

Blitzkrieg I: Poland

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Surrounded on three sides by German armies Poland was easy meat for the Panzer Divisions that split the Polish forces up into pockets and then destroyed them.

BLITZKRIEG

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Until the autumn of 1959 wars in Europe could last for years. Leaders would attempt to find a tactical or strategic advantage - by manoeuvring to find open flanks, routes through swamps or forests or by making surprise river crossings.

In World War I the open flanks disappeared as trenches were dug that stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea. The advantage now seemed to lie with the defender. New tactics would be needed to break through these linear defences. Military theorists in Europe and America looked at deep penetration tactics using the weapons that had grown out of World War I - tanks and bombers.

At the outset of operations the enemy would be confused by a series of spoiling attacks along the length of the front while fighters dominated the skies. They would be put under pressure and have no clear idea of where the real threat lay.

Then at a few selected points the full weight of fire from tanks, artillery and bombers would be concentrated on narrow fronts. The intense weight of this bombardment shattered the defences. Reconnaissance units would probe forward and then tanks pour through the hole and into the rear areas like an expanding torrent. The enemy's defence would lose cohesion as communications links were severed, headquarters bombed, paratroops seized key points and tanks roamed unrestricted deep behind the front line. Suddenly a war between nations could be fought and won in weeks.

To describe these dramatic tactics in 1940 the journalist Eugene Hadamovsky coined a new word. He called German operations in Poland a Blitzmarsch nach Warschau (Lightning March to Warsaw) and from this came Blitzkrieg - Lightning War.

Dr Joseph Goebbels Reichsminister fur Volkserklarung und Propaganda (Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) and the Nazi propagandists seized on Blitzkrieg idea and revelled in its resonance.

Blitz and Blitzkrieg have now passed into everyday use as a synonym for intense air attacks or fast moving land battles.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STUG III G EARLY AND LATE MODEL

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The late model featured all steel return rollers, instead of the rubber tire ones found on earlier types. Also, the late model had an armoured wedge in front of the commander's cupola.

Early models had a simple fold-down MG shield, late models had remotely controlled MGs. Late models featured "Pilze" mounts for a roof mounted crane. Early models had an alloy protective ring covering the nuts and bolts on the drive sprockets, a detail left off on later versions. There are some differences between tool clamps and tow cable clamps, but this is a little difficult to describe. Late models featured a collapsible gun support crutch welded to the glacis plate.

Two very reasonably priced books to get you going are Tom Cockles' most excellent StuG G Walkaround and MK Editions StuG III 'modelling manual'.

'Late StuGs'.
Cast topfblende: added co-axial MG port (Oct. 1944 per Achtung Panzer 5)
Nahverteidigunswaffe on the roof (May.1944 per Achtung Panzer 5)but sometimes the hole is seen plated over.
Pilze for jib boom Jul-Sep 3 mounts, Oct. 1944 on 5 mounts (Achtung Panzer 5 again).
Change to 80mm plate (welded) on the RHS front superstructure.
Cooling air outlet from four partitions to two (and reduction of the mounting bolts on the rear plate thereof).
Fan belt adjustment cover deleted.
Added centred tow pintle (Dec. 1944 per Achtung Panzer 5)
Rear deck to hull side armour welded interlocks changed from straight to morticed
Muzzle brake changed
Frontal (nose) armour early-mid 50mm base plus 30mm add on. Late 80mm base (StuG WA)
Three variants steel return wheels.

The bolts holding down the fighting compartment roof changed from countersunk screws for the early's and mid's to raised hex heads for the lates.

Also the lates had a small section of angle iron with holding hooks fitted to the back wall of the fighting compartment (to hold up the engine hatches).

Since nothing's ever simple with the Wehrmacht, there were late StuG IIIs with the square gun mantlet as well.

Best tank of WW II criteria???

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Operationally speaking the Sherman was the best tank because it featured the best all round reliability. When the T-34 started out they were losing 60 out of every 100 tanks for every 100kms driven on marches alone. The German Pz III did much better than this marching over the same ground and distance losing about 1/3 tanks, so in the early war period the Pz-III was the best.

As the war progressed the German ammo manufacturing failed to keep pace and the replacement ballooned into the Panther monster tank, which had appalling reliability.

In the late war period Russian tank loses [read T-34] were around 13% for every 100km driven. But this was more of a reflection of the improved emphasis the Soviets placed on parts and the logistics tail of their combat units. Meanwhile Sherman reliability topped all in no small part to design.

When you look at the Tactical side, the most important quality is fire power as this is the mechanism that kills and that's what settles the battle. In terms of firepower the most important criteria is ROF or rate of fire. Obviously nothing can be stated as simplistic as that, because there's a point where ROF can't make up for poor ammo penetration. This is why the failure of the German ammunition concept -when the AP 40 shots (Tungsten Carbide) disappeared - became one of their biggest failures.

In the initial stages the Pz-III was the best tactically due to its high rate of fire [2:1 against the French/ British and 3-4:1 against the Russians]. By mid war the Panthers and Tigers featured lower ROFs while allies remained the same [8 rpm Germans Vs 3-4 rpm T-34s and 10-12 rpm for the Shermans ]. So the heavy armor and fire power worked against the Russians- to war’s end, but didn't work so well against the western allies.

It’s hard to show just how important ROF is but if you take 2 tanks that are equal in all respects but blue out shoots red by 3:1 then- in an even battle -blue will inflict 10:1 kill ratios. Even outnumbered, this kill ratio can be maintained due to the smoke and fog of war. This allows better trained troops to section off large numbers into mini firefights near one on one. The weak point of the ROF argument is that it does require 'well trained troops' and to preserve those you do need good armor over enough of the front quadrant to allow the said 'well trained troops' to survive.

So I guess the bottom line is you can't pin down the best tank unless you have a proper strategy and tactics. If you’re forced to change mid stride, like the Germans you have to adjust your designs accordingly. Even the Poorly designed T-34 is the best tank at the end of the war because the Soviets finally got their tank; logistics and strategic situation right.

Sources on which statement? Zalogas ROF figures are from the Osprey booklets. The modern ROF figures are from numerous discussions on the 'Tankers Net' with M-1 , LEO-2 and Russian Tankers etc about the topic over a number of years. One American Tanker told me that its apart of their doctrine to be able to go from a 'turret down' position fire 3 shots, at more than one target if needed, and pull back to 'turret down' in 12-15 seconds. This leaves only about 8-12 seconds for the actual firing, AND NO PRELOADED ROUNDS. Test on battlefield situation awareness show that only 1/3 of troops tested [British] 'see' a target the moment it comes into view, another third take 10 seconds to 'spot' the target while the rest take up to a minute. With that kind of fact a badly outnumbered defender can easily use terrain to pick and choose where to fight and win.

Pz.III Typen XIV

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Pz.III Typen XIII

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Pz.III Typen XII

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Pz.III Typen XI

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Pz.III Typen X

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Pz.III Typen IX

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Pz.III Typen VIII

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Pz.III Typen VII

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Pz.III Typen VI

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Pz.III Typen V

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Pz.III Typen IV

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Pz.III Typen III

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Pz.III Typen II

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Pz.III Typen I

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PzKpfw III AUSF. N cross-section

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PzKpfw III AUSF. N cross-section

1. 7.92mm MG34 TMG 2. Additional 20mm plate 3. Driver cockpit 4. 7,5 cm L24 cannon 5. Gun shield 6. Gun loading system 7. Cooling 8. Anti-recoil shield 9. Cupola sight	10. Emergency door 11. Commander's cupola 12. Gun elevation gear 13. Engine 14. Exhaust pipe 15. Return wheel 16. Sprocket wheel	17. Engine transmission 18. Commander's seat 19. Torsion bar suspension 20. Driver's seat 21. Gear box 22. Command clutch 23. Friction pedal 24. Drive-sprocket wheel 25. Dish brakes

PANZERKAMPFWAGEN III MEDIUM TANK

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It was envisaged in the mid-1930s that each German tank battalion would have three companies of relatively light medium tanks and one company of better armed and armoured medium tanks. The former eventually became the Panzerkampfwagen III (PzkPfw III) or SdKfz 141, while the latter became the Panzerkampfwagen IV (PzKpfw IV) which was to remain in production throughout World War II. In 1935 the Weapons Department issued contracts for the construction of prototype vehicles against the lighter concept to Daimler-Benz, Krupp, MAN and Rheinmetall-Borsig. At an early stage it was decided to arm the tank with a 37-mm gun which would fire the same ammunition as that used by the infantry anti-tank gun, but provision was made that the turret ring diameter be large enough to permit the upgunning of the vehicle to 50 mm if this should be required. Following trials with the prototype vehicles the Daimler- Benz model was selected, although the first three production models, the PzKpfw III Ausf A, PzKpfw III Ausf B and PzKpfw III Ausf C were built only in small numbers, differing from each other mainly in suspension details, In September 1939 the vehicle was formally adopted for service, and mass production was soon under way. The PzKpfw III was first used in combat during the invasion of Poland, The next production models were the PzKpfw III Ausf D and PzKpfw III Ausf F, the former with thicker armour and a revised cupola, and the latter with an uprated engine and only six road wheels. In 1939 it was decided to push ahead with the 50-mm model and this entered production in 1940 under the designation PzKpfw III Ausf F. This was followed by the PzKpfw III Ausf G version with similar armament but more powerful engine. For operations in North Africa the vehicles were fitted with a tropical kit, while for the proposed invasion of England a special version for deep wading was developed. The latter were never used for their intended role but some were successfully used during the invasion of the USSR in 1941. The PzKpfw Aus H introduced wider tracks and a number of important improvements,

The 50-mm L/42 gun was inadequate to cope with the Soviet T-34 tank, so the longer-barrelled KwK 39 L/60 weapon was installed. This had a higher muzzle velocity, and vehicles fitted with the weapon were designated PzKpfw III Ausf J. Many vehicles were retrofitted with the 50-mm gun, and by early 1942 the 37-mm version had almost disappeared from front-line service. The next model was the PzKpfw III Ausf L, which had greater armour protection, pushing its weight up to just over 22 tonnes, almost 50 per cent more than the weight of the original prototype. The PzKpfw III Ausf M and PzKpfw III Ausf N were fitted with the 75-mm L/24 gun which had been installed in the PzKpfw IV; a total of 64 rounds of ammunition were carried for this gun. Production of the PzKpfw III was finally completed in August 1943. The chassis was also used as the basis for the 75- mm assault gun (Gepanzerte Selbstahrlafette für Sturmgeschütz 7.5 cm Kanone or SdKfz 142), of which a few were used in the invasion of France in 1941; production of improved SP guns on PzKpfw III chassis continued until the end of World War II. Other variants included an armoured recovery vehicle, an armoured observation vehicle (Panzerbeobachtungswagen) and a command vehicle (Panzerbefehlswagen III), A total of 15,000 chassis was produced for both the tank and assault gun applications.

The layout of the PzKpfw III was basically the same in all vehicles, with the driver at the front of the hull on the left and the machine-gunner/radio operator to his right. The three-man turret was in the centre of the hull, the commander having a cupola in the centre of the roof at the rear. The engine was at the rear of the hull, and the suspension, which was of the torsion bar type from the PzKpfw III Ausf E, consisted on each side of six small road wheels, with the drive sprocket at the front and the idler at the rear; there were three track-return rollers.

CHAR VERSUS PANZER

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Given the rapidity of the German victory over France, Belgium and Holland and the pivotal role played by the Panzer Divisions in bringing this about, the superficial judgement at the time was that German tanks must not only have been more numerous than those of the Allied armies, but also superior to them. However, we will need to qualify how this term was understood. For the purposes of immediate explanation, we will assume that 'superior' was employed as a shorthand for greater numbers, heavier armour and more effective fire power.

a) Numbers

There is no question that, as regards the first of these greater numbers, the Western Allies possessed at the beginning of Fall Gelb a decided superiority in the numbers of tanks that they could field compared to the Germans at the beginning of Fall Gelb. While full breakdowns by tank type and their totals for each of the ten Panzer Divisions are provided in tabular form, the overall number of tanks deployed by the Panzerwaffe for combat operations on 10 May 1940 amounted to 2,582 machines of all types. This was exceeded by a considerable margin by the number possessed by the French Army alone. The French maintained a tank park of some 4,360 machines of all types, of which 250 were stationed overseas in their colonial territories at that date. By far and away the bulk and best of France's armoured strength was stationed on the north-east Front ready to deploy into Belgium once news had been received of the opening of the German offensive. Not only did the French possess a quantitative advantage over the Panzerwaffe in theatre, but also many of their tanks were also superior in the thickness of armour protection they carried and in the calibre of the armament they mounted. Even the Germans themselves accepted that a number of the tank types being fielded by the French Army were superior to their own, the best example of this being the Somua S-35 cavalry medium tank, regarded by many armour pundits of the time as one of the finest in the world.

Although of lesser importance, the armoured contributions of the British and the Belgians served to raise total Allied numbers to just over 4,000 machines. This numerical strength explains why General Gamelin was so confident that the Allied tank force would crush that of the Germans when they invaded Belgium en masse which, as we have seen, he was absolutely convinced they would.

b) Armour

The greatest disparity between the tanks of the Germans and the French lay in the area of armour protection. Even the heaviest Panzer in service at the time of the invasion of France - the Panzer IV Ausf D- weighing in at a modest 18 tons, mounted armour no thicker than 30mm across its frontal arc, although the gun mantlet was formed of 35mm of rolled armour plate. The equivalent machine in the French Army at the time - the Char B1Bis - at nearly double the weight of a Pz, had frontal armour double the thickness of the pz at 60mm. At the time of the German offensive in the west, the two tanks planned to become the standard equipment of the Panzerwaffe were woefully protected.

At the other end of the spectrum, the most numerous German tank was the diminutive Panzer I light tank, whose maximum armour thickness of just 13mm was not even enough to withstand a high velocity rifle bullet. It was to prove appallingly vulnerable to every calibre of gun mounted on French tanks and to Allied anti-tank guns. This machine, and the later Panzer II light tank - the second most numerous German tank to see service in the French campaign - had also proved vulnerable in Poland to enemy anti-tank rifle fire by virtue of their very thin armour. Remedial action was undertaken in the months following the Polish campaign to improve the protection of the Panzer II by the addition of rivetted plates of 20mm armour. Although only some 70 per cent of the Panzer II inventory had been improved in this fashion by 10 May, this did serve to increase the maximum thickness across the vital frontal arc of those machines to approximately 35mm, and this enabled the Germans to rectify the design's most evident weakness. Nonetheless, both machines were castigated by their operators in the French campaign as being 'unfit for combat'.

Although the French Army was still deploying quite a number of its early AMC and AMR light tanks whose armour was equivalent to that of the Panzer I and II, the most numerous and modern machines of this class, namely the Renault 35, Hotchkiss 35/39 and Renault 35, all mounted a maximum of 40mm of armour as standard. Thus, the most common French light tank in May 1940 carried thicker armour than did the heaviest Panzer!

It was, however, when the Germans faced the British Matilda 11 that they encountered the tank bearing the heaviest armour of any in the 1940 campaign, Although the thinnest carried by this machine was just 20mm, found on its hull and turret tops, the 78mm of its cast hull front and nose rendered it invulnerable to any weapon carried by any German AFV, in 1940. As was to be found later when it was also encountered in the Western Desert, the 88mm Flak 18/36 gun was needed to despatch the beast!

While in the aftermath of defeat the myth that the Germans were fielding more numerous and better armoured tanks became a convenient excuse to explain away the rapid Allied collapse, the matter was actually made worse by virtue of the fact that the weapons carried by these same Allied tanks were also better than those of the Panzers!

c) Firepower

The twin 7.92mm MG-13 machine guns carried by the Panzer I rendered the type suitable for little more then infantry support, whilst the 20mm KwK L\130 cannon of the Panzer II was ineffective in penetrating all of the French types. However, it could do so with the armour of the British light and cruiser tanks, and these were penetrated at all ranges. In post-campaign analysis, the 37mm calibre gun mounted on the Panzer Mark III and the Pak36 anti-tank gun were castigated as being inadequate to penetrate enemy tanks. It was for this reason that this weapon acquired the unflattering sobriquet of the army's 'door knocker'. Numerous reports spoke of 37mm shells from both weapons simply bouncing off the armour of tanks like the Somua and Char Bl-Bis. What emerged as the most effective tank mounted weapon against enemy tanks in the French campaign was the low velocity, 75mm KwK37 L\24 gun carried on the Panzer IV. This weapon had not been designed for this purpose, as it was essentially a low velocity howitzer appropriate for the Panzer's designated task of supporting infantry end other tanks. As the largest calibre weapon carried by any of the Panzers, it fired the heaviest shell and, when employing the limited number of Sprenggrenate (armour piercing shells) ammunition it carried in combat (with the majority carried being HE), it was able to take on and defeat the Somua S-35, albeit only up to a range of 600 metres. Beyond this distance, the effectiveness of the weapon fell off rapidly. However, even the 75mm weapon found difficulty penetrating the heavier frontal armour of the Char B1. One German officer later observed that in a one to one with either of these French tanks, even the Panzer IV would have little chance of success.

On paper, which is in terms of a straight comparison in the size and effectiveness of weaponry, most French tanks also had an advantage across the board relative to those carried by the Panzers. Apart from the older AMR 35 which mounted, like the Panzer I, nothing other than a machine gun, all other French designs fielded weapons of 25mm calibre or more. As the most numerous type in service with the French Army in 1940, the H-35 class of light cavalry tanks carried a 37mm or 40mm weapon, double the size of that carried by their German counterparts, Even the obsolescent FT-17, dating to the First World War and still in service in some numbers in 1940, albeit mainly in reserve units, mounted a 37mm gun. The two most formidable French machines - namely the Somua S-35 and Char Bl-Bis - both mounted a variant of the excellent French 47mm anti-tank gun in their turrets, while the latter also disposed of a75mm weapon in its lower front hull.

The 2 pounder OF (quick firing) gun was the main armament of the British Army cruiser tanks and of the Matilda II heavy infantry support tank encountered by the Germans in the French Campaign. Although later castigated by its users in the Western Desert, primarily for its lack of a high explosive shell, the 2pdr was none the less regarded as one of the best weapons of its type in the world in 1940. A barrel length of 50 calibres allowed the gun to tire an AP round at quite a high velocity, thus permitting British tankers to hit the more lightly armoured German Panzers at a greater range. It was superior to its nearest enemy equivalent, the 37mm weapon mounted on the Panzer III.

Char versus Panzer: The factors that really mattered!

Notwithstanding the 'on paper' superiority of French armour in particular areas, the 1940 campaign would illustrate the degree to which these were degraded by a whole series of other factors. These ranged from French Army doctrine and organisation through to general design limitations and other issues, all of which combined to render the whole, in the crucible of war, to be substantially less than the sum of its parts.

It is a truism that French armour doctrine at the start of the Second World War was in essence no different to that at the end of the First. The roles of the tank were that of infantry support and the provision of a mechanised equivalent of the cavalry. These two suppositions governed all aspects of tank unit organisation, their use, design and development In the inter-war period. It meant that when faced with a technologically inferior enemy whose tank arm was predicated upon a far more dynamic concept of the use of armour and air power, the French were unable to respond in an effective way and went down to defeat. Cited as a maxim in pre-war French Service Regulations, tanks had to observe the requirement of only moving as fast as the infantry they were supporting. In consequence, the specifications issued for new machines to fulfil the support role rarely required that they have a maximum speed beyond 17 mph. These machines formed the core of the five Light Cavalry Divisions in 1940. These comprised a light mechanised brigade equipped with the H-35/R-35/H-38/H-39 tanks, Panhard armoured cars and mechanised infantry. It is a measure of their anachronistic structure that they still included a brigade of cavalry.

The Cavalry Division analogue was to be found in the three Divisions Legeres Mecaniques (abbreviated hereafter to DLM). These light mechanised divisions were seen conceptually as mechanised cavalry. Their primary role was to advance to the fore of the main force and screen its movements - a role that Joachim Murat, Napoleon's commander of cavalry, would have related to without difficulty save for the fact that these steeds were of steel and not flesh and blood I Fielding a mixture of Hotchkiss light tanks and the more formidable Somua S-35s, two of these divisions would be involved in the largest tank clash of the campaign at Hannut in Belgium on 12 and 13 May.

Evidence, however, that the contribution played by the Panzerwaffe in the rapid defeat of Poland had not gone by way of the board in France can be seen in how between September 1939 and May 1940 the French had moved very quickly to create their own equivalent of the Panzer Division. Four Divisions Cuirassees Rapide (hereafter abbreviated to DCR) were set up in short order. Three were already part of the order of battle on 10 May. The fourth, as yet still forming, was under the command of a certain Colonel Charles de Gaulle (one of the few minds in the French camp in the 1930s who had been in tune with German armoured developments and had argued for the same in France). With a mechanised infantry battalion and two battalions of artillery, the core of these formations was built around two battalions of 60 Char B1Bis. This was the premier tank of the French Army in 1940. However, it had not been designed for rapide. Its original specification had called for a machine to provide infantry support! The top speed of just 18mph illustrates the point. More numerous were 78 Hotchkiss H-39s that were also organised in two battalions. When enabled to take up static positions, the heavy frontal armour and weapons of French machines enabled them to deal without difficulty with all German tanks -their armour being so weak.

When denied that facility, they succumbed rapidly to the superior movement of the Panzer formation operating in concert with other arms and the Luftwaffe. This was bound to happen at any time the Germans effected a breakthrough of the French line - be it held by infantry or armour - because of the latter's attention to the maintenance of contiguous lines. This hangover from the Great War, when trench lines dictated the requirement to preserve a coherent front, contained within it the seeds of many errors made in 1940 by the French Army. By default it conferred many tactical and strategic gains on the Germans, who rapidly and ruthlessly exploited every opportunity provided when this effect of this anachronistic doctrine was employed.

Although the new DCRs appeared formidable on paper, they had been set up to emulate a formation whose armour doctrine was alien to the French military mind. It would take more than a few months and a reorganisation of assets to copy what the Germans had done in Poland. Herein is to be seen a profound weakness in the design of French armour that was to impact on its ability to duplicate the mobility of the Panzer Divisions in Poland. We have already alluded to the slowness of French tank designs. It was also the case that the efficiency of any Char in battle in 1940 was seriously handicapped by the one-man turret they all carried. To the commander of the vehicle, who had to identify the target, also fell the tasks of aiming the gun, rotating the turret, loading the gun and firing it. Nor was he helped by the poor view provided for him by limited optics. However, all of the aforementioned were then compounded by the slow traverse of the turret.

Contrast this with German design practice. Unlike their French counterparts, the German medium Panzers had crews of five men. Representing, as they did, the machines that would see the Panzerwaffe through to 1943, and in the case of the Pz IV through to the defeat in 1945, the insistence by the Heeres Waffenamt on a three-man turret design was proved by experience. A commander, loader and aimer were deemed to provide the best arrangement for the division of labour in carrying out those tasks, thereby providing the optimum efficiency of the workload of a crew when in battle. With the commander able to observe events from his cupola and communicate his orders via a throat microphone, this permitted the Panzer to rapidly move and shift both vehicle and main armament from target to target. The trump card, however, for the German way of war in 1940 was the radios carried by all Panzers, but very few Chars. In a real sense, they were the war winner.

It was the onboard radios carried by all Panzers that permitted them to manoeuvre rapidly on the battlefield to take account of contingencies as they arose. It was accepted even in 1940 that 'the primary method of command in combat' was the radio. Drilling in the use of this medium was deemed by the Panzerwaffe to be as important as firing accurately. By 1940, the Panzerwaffe had had years of practice in war games and operations in which to develop their radio procedures and inculcate the protocols of such in their tank crews. A short insight into the sophistication of such methods and their common usage through the tank arm in 1940 can be gleaned from this instruction manual extract:

'Movements are carried out according to radio command, previous orders or signals (although radio was accepted as being the most workable means of command - author comment). On the order to move out, all tanks start moving uniformly and at first, straight ahead. If a change of formation is desired at the same time as the start of the move, the formation order is given first, followed by the order to move out. Distances, intervals and formation are assumed while driving .... When changing direction of the march, the commander orders 'Follow me!' or 'Direction of march is... !' while giving point or compass bearing. If a formation change is to take place at the same time, the march direction is given first, followed by the new formation. Platoons that have four, instead of five, tanks execute these formations and manoeuvres in analogous fashion'.

The degree of control implicit in such a short extract and the sophistication required to effect it betokens a great expertise in radio employment. Herein lies the French bafflement at the ability of the Germans to move their tanks around en masse and effect a rapid concentration of effort and firepower where they desired it. This is hardly surprising when very few French tanks actually possessed radios. Apart from a cultural obsession with radio security, which provides one explanation as to why they were not fitted in their tanks, the other problem arose again directly out of the perception that tanks were only to provide support for the infantry. In such circumstances, radios were not necessary, signal flags would suffice and, once drawn up in their static lines facing the enemy, it was thought to be enough for an officer or runner to move from tank to tank passing on orders in person by word of mouth!

The sophisticated German radio net went beyond tank to tank. It also permitted a degree of communication between ground and air that had never been seen before. Attached to the Panzer Divisions were Fliegerleittrupps-tactical air control parties - which were provided with wheeled vehicles. At this juncture of the war there were too few SPWs available to be fitted out for this role, although they would become a more familiar sight from 1941 onward. Their task was to be in close proximity to the advancing Panzers. When the tank divisions' own towed artillery could not eliminate a target, the Fliegerleit offizier-the air control officer - elicited what air support was available and contacted the pilots on their frequency. In 1940, it was the Stuka and the Henschel Hs-123 which provided this help, with the bulk of the air support being provided by the former. The air control officer would then talk the pilots into the area so that they could recognise the target. In the meantime, troops with the Panzers would have demarcated their own positions relative to that of the enemy by laying out on the ground special identification panels. It was later claimed that the support given to Guderian's thrust to the channel saw the most effective use of air support of the war, with Stukas being on hand to deal with targets within 15-20 minutes of being called.